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1981] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
Prior inconsistent statements suppressed as violative of Miranda
may be used for impeachment purposes notwithstanding defen-
dant's contention that. they were fabricated by police
The Supreme Court's initial pronouncement of the exclusion-
ary rule concerning evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's
fifth amendment rights suggested that such evidence would be
inadmissible at trial for all purposes.'" Subsequently, in Harris v.
'" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). At common law, the manner in which evi-
dence was obtained was not determinative of its admissibility. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE §
2183 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see, e.g., Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624
(1897); State v. Mathers, 64 Vt. 101, 23 A. 590 (1892). In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914), however, the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule, which renders evi-
dence seized in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights inadmissible as evidence
in chief. Id. at 398. Made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the exclusionary rule was later expanded to include restrictions
on the use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes. See AgnelIo v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391
(1920). In Agnello, the police seized a quantity of narcotics during an unlawful search of the
defendant's home. The defendant did not testify about the illegally seized items on direct
examination and, on cross-examination, he denied ever having seen them. Subsequently, the
prosecution sought to introduce the items into evidence. 269 U.S. at 30. The Supreme Court
held that the illegally seized evidence could not be used for purposes of impeachment. Id. at
34-35. The Agnello Court followed the rule first enunciated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), wherein Mr. Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he essence
of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."
269 U.S. at 35 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) established a limited exception to the rule laid
down in Agnello. In Walder, the Court ruled that illegally obtained evidence may be used in
rebuttal once the defendant goes beyond denying the charges against him and makes state-
ments of a general nature. Id. at 65. Specifically, Agnello was distinguished on the basis of
the Walder defendant's "sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcot-
ics." Id. at 66. It should also be noted that Walder concerned evidence collateral to the
crime charged, whereas Agnello dealt with evidence which was directly related to the crime
charged. See generally Note, The Collateral Use Doctrine: From Walder to Miranda, 62
Nw. U.L. REv. 912 (1968).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), significantly broadened the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule. The Miranda Court held that "the prosecution may not use statements...
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S.
at 444. See generally Kent, Miranda v. Arizona-The Use of Inadmissible Evidence for
Impeachment Purposes, 18 W. REs. L. Rv. 1177 (1967); Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poison-
ous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALiF. L. REv. 579 (1968).
Prior to Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), some courts read this as holding that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda could not be used to impeach the defendant.
See, e.g., State v. Galaso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968); cf. Agius v. United States, 413 F.2d
915, 920 (5th Cir. 1969) (vitality of Walder as applied to such statements is "extremely
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New York,185 the Supreme Court qualified its position by holding
that statements made in the absence of Miranda warnings may be
used to impeach the credibility of a witness provided "the trust-
worthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. '18 The extent
to which the trustworthiness proviso of Harris limits the availabil-
ity of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes has
been uncertain.18 7 Recently, in People v. Washington,1 a8 the Court
of Appeals held that the trustworthiness requirement did not bar
the admission of prior inconsistent statements where, at a pretrial
suppression hearing, the court had determined that the defendant
had neither been given the required Miranda warnings nor had
made the statements in issue.189
In Washington, the police went to the defendant's apartment
to investigate a report of a man with a gun.""" After being admitted
by the defendant's wife, they found the defendant asleep on the
questionable"); People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 322-23, 221 N.E.2d 541, 542, 274 N.Y.S.2d
873, 875 (1966) (statement obtained in violation of Escobedo held inadmissible for impeach-
ment), discussed in Note, New York's Decision To Allow Impeachment in Order To Find
Truth, 13 N.Y.L.F. 148 (1967). Contra, State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818
(1969).
285 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
I86 Id. at 224. The petitioner in Harris was charged with selling heroin to an undercover
police officer. Harris was interrogated without having been informed of his right to counsel.
Id. at 222-23. At trial, he took the stand and denied committing the alleged crimes. Conced-
ing that the defendant's statements were inadmissible under Miranda, the prosecution
made no effort to use them in its case in chief. Id. at 223-24. On cross-examination, however,
prior inconsistent statements made during the interrogation were admitted into evidence for
the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility. Id. at 223. In a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court affirmed the resulting conviction, holding that the statements could be used
to impeach the defendant's credibility despite the lack of Miranda warnings provided they
met "legal standards of trustworthiness." Id. at 224. The Court relied on Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), where a similar exception was created to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. See note 184 supra. This reliance on Walder has been criticized, however,
on the ground that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters, see note 184 supra, while
Harris' testimony directly related to the crime charged. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 227-28 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine In The Bur-
ger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 109-11; Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE
L.J. 1198, 1211-18 (1971); Recent Decisions, Constitutonal Law-Evidence-Statements
Inadmissible Against a Defendant as Substantive Evidence May be Used to Impeach
Credibility of Defendants Trial Testimony, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), 39
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1241, 1245-47 (1971).
I8 See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine In The Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 113.
51 N.Y.2d 214, 413 N.E.2d 1164, 433 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1980), af'g 68 App. Div. 2d 90,
416 N.Y.S.2d 626 (2d Dep't 1979).
189 51 N.Y.2d at 217-18, 223, 413 N.E.2d at 1160-61, 1163, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
19 Id. at 218, 413 N.E.2d at 1160, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
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living room couch with a gun protruding from his pocket.191 A po-
lice officer removed the gun and arrested him.9 2 At a pretrial sup-
pression hearing,m93 the arresting officer testified that the defen-
dant, after being advised of his Miranda rights,, had made two
inconsistent statements as to how he had obtained the gun.1 94 The
defendant's counsel noted, however, that the alleged statements
were not included in the report of the arresting officer or men-
tioned by him at the preliminary hearing.1 95 This, he contended,
led to the conclusion that the statements attributed to the defen-
dant had been fabricated by the arresting officer.196 The hearing
judge suppressed the statements, ruling that the People had not
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Miranda warnings
191 Id.
192 Id.
13 The defendant sought a pretrial suppression hearing on the issue of whether the oral
statements were "made in violation of [his] Constitutional rights." 68 App. Div. 2d 90, 92,
416 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (2d Dep't 1979). The method previously used by the New York courts
to determine the admissibility of confessions and other extrajudicial statements was de-
clared unconstitutional in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Under that procedure,
when a question of voluntariness was presented the trial court ordinarily submitted the is-
sue to the jury. Where there was no dispute as to the relevant facts, however, the judge
decided the issue of voluntariness. See People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927);
People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909). If the jury found the confession to be
involuntary, it was instructed to disregard it entirely. Although this procedure was upheld in
Stein v. People, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), the Supreme Court subsequently found it to be viola-
tive of defendants' fourteenth amendment rights. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391
(1964).
In People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965), the Court
of Appeals adopted a new procedure which provided for the separate hearing to resolve
questions of voluntariness. Id. at 77, 204 N.E.2d at 182-83, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43; see CPL
§ 710.30 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). At the Huntley hearing, the prosecution bears the
burden of establishing the voluntariness of statements beyond a reasonable doubt. The de-
fendant may be impeached if he testifies but he may not be cross-examined on the merits of
the case unless his statements on direct examination make the questions relevant. See W.
RICHARDSON, EVMENc E § 550 (10th ed. Prince 1973). If the voluntariness of the defendant's
statements is not established beyond a reasonable doubt then the statements must be sup-
pressed. See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d at 78, 204 N.E.2d at 183, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
Conversely, if the statements are shown to have been voluntary they will be admissible at
trial. The defendant still may submit the issue of voluntariness to the jury at trial. Because
the defendant, in effect, has two opportunities to have his confession discounted on the
ground of involuntariness, this procedure has come to be known as the "humane rule." W.
RIcHARDSON, supra, at § 550.
51 N.Y.2d at 218, 413 N.E.2d at 1161, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 746. According to the arrest-
ing officer, the defendant initially stated that he had found the gun but later asserted that
his wife had planted the gun on him. Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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were given or that the statements were made.197 The trial judge
subsequently ruled that the suppressed statements could be used
for impeachment purposes.l98 Testifying on his own behalf, the de-
fendant denied any knowledge of how the gun had come into his
possession and that he had made any statement to the police.299
When called in rebuttal, the arresting officer testified that the de-
fendant had indeed made conflicting statements as to how he had
obtained the gun.200 The defendant was found guilty of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree.20 1 His conviction was
affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department. 2
On appeal, a unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed. 03 Writing
for the Court, Judge Wachtler initially rejected the prosecution's
contention that trustworthiness was synonymous with voluntari-
ness.2 0 4 The Court observed that statements obtained through the
use of involuntary means are inadmissible for all purposes not be-
cause of their inherent unreliability but rather because "the meth-
ods used to extract them offend the Constitution. 2 05 Judge Wach-
tler similarly refused to accept the defendant's contention that the
hearing court's factual findings rendered the alleged statements
inadmissible for impeachment purposes. The Washington Court
reasoned that common-law rules of evidence do not require a court
to determine whether prior inconsistent statements were actually
made before permitting their use as an impeachment device.208 A
contrary holding, according to Judge Wachtler, would broaden the
scope of suppression hearings and invade the jury's role as the ar-
biter of purely factual questions.2 0 7 Moreover, the Court noted that
7 Id. at 219, 413 N.E.2d at 1161, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 219, 413 N.E.2d at 1161, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 68 App. Div. 2d 90, 101, 416 N.Y.S.2d 626, 633 (2d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 214,
413 N.E.2d 1159, 433 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1980).
20. Id. at 223, 413 N.E.2d at 1163, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
204 Id. at 220, 413 N.E.2d at 1162, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
205 Id.
2-0 Id. at 221, 413 N.E.2d at 1162, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Judge Wachtler conceded that a
suppression judge may find it necessary, in some cases, to determine whether a defendant
actually made a disputed statement. He noted, however, that this is a collateral finding
which is necessary to measure the credibility of a police officer's testimony that he had
advised the defendant of his rights. Id. at 221 n.1, 413 N.E.2d at 1162 n.1., 433 N.Y.S.2d at
748 n.1.
207 Id. at 222, 413 N.E.2d at 1163, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 749. Judge Wachtler suggested that
the net effect of a contrary holding would be a recognition of fabrication as an independent
[Vol. 55:552
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although an involuntarily obtained confession may be improperly
relied upon by the jury if admitted for impeachment purposes, the
same risk is unlikely to be present where the jury finds that the
statements themselves were fabricated by the police.20  Finally,
Judge Wachtler concluded that nothing in Harris mandated any
change in the standards governing the use of prior inconsistent
statements or in the scope of the exclusionary rule.209
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals' refusal to equate
trustworthiness with voluntariness is consistent with recent deci-
sions which indicate the existence of an independent constitutional
ground for the exclusion of involuntary statements.210 When state-
ments are not found to be voluntary, the question of trustworthi-
ness becomes irrelevant.2 ' Moreover, since the limited purpose of
basis for exclusion. Id. (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
208 51 N.Y.2d at 222, 413 N.E.2d at 1163, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49.
09 Id.
210 See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385 (1978); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
In Rogers, the Court stated that involuntary confessions are inadmissible "not because such
confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend the
Constitution." Id. at 540-41.
The term voluntary has not remained static in meaning. Initially, this term was limited
to physical coercion. See, e.g., White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936). Later, however, psychological coercion came to be included in the con-
cept. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
The justification for the voluntariness requirement has shifted from the inherent unreli-
ability of the evidence, see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941), to the fairness of
police practices, see Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961), and the individual's
ability to choose freely, see Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Gallegos v. Colo-
rado, 370 U.S. 49, 50-51 (1962). See also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S, 503, 513-14 (1963).
Consequently, many variables enter into a contemporary determination of voluntariness.
See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 519-21 (1968) (physical disability); Beecher
v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967) (race); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (wo-
man inexperienced with criminal law); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) (age);
State v. Smith, 342 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Mo. 1961) (educational level); People v. Schompert, 19
N.Y.2d 300, 305, 226 N.E.2d 305, 308, 279 N.Y.S.2d 515, 519, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874
(1967) (intoxication).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), recognized the impracticality of the voluntari-
ness test because the secretive nature of a custodial interrogation made it difficult to deter-
mine the circumstances under which a statement was made. The Miranda Court reasoned
that the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation can be dispelled only if the defen-
dant is given proper warnings. Id. at 45-58. Thus, under Miranda, voluntariness equated
with an intelligent waiver of one's rights.
211 See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 398 (1978). In Portash, the Supreme Court held that a testifying defendant may
not be impeached through the use of reliable grand jury testimony. Id. at 459-60. The Court
reasoned that "[t]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a privilege against com-
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a pretrial suppression hearing is to determine the voluntariness of
a confession, a claim by the accused denying the utterance of the
challenged statement should not, in itself, invoke an application of
the trustworthiness standard.2 12
Notwithstanding the proper resolution of these issues, it is
suggested that the Washington Court failed to adequately define
the scope of the trustworthiness proviso in cases where the sup-
pressed statements are deemed to have been made voluntarily. Al-
though the Court implied that trustworthiness is related to com-
mon-law limitations on the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements,1 3 it did not attempt to delineate the exact nature of
these standards nor did it apply them to the defendant's claim of
fabricated evidence. Since the sole criterion in Harris restricting
the use of uncoerced statements for impeachment purposes in-
volves a determination of trustworthiness, clear guidance is critical.
While trustworthiness has not been expressly rejected as a factor
affecting the admissibility of voluntary statements or confessions,
it is submitted that the Washington Court, in effect, has sanc-
tioned a finding of voluntariness as the key determination.2 1" In-
pelled self-incrimination, not merely against unreliable self-incrimination." 440 U.S. at 459
(emphasis in original). Because testimony given under a grant of immunity is considered
"coerced," it cannot be used to impeach the defendant's credibility at his subsequent trial
Id.
Other courts, however, have construed the Harris proviso as requiring only a showing of
voluntariness. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1976); cf. Nowlin v. State, 346 So. 2d 1020, 1024 (Fla. 1977) (trustworthiness means, "at the
very least," voluntariness). The California Supreme Court rejected the Harris doctrine as a
matter of state constitutional law, on the ground that the rule would "resurrect the remains
of the ... voluntariness test" developed prior to Miranda. 16 Cal. 3d at 111, 545 P.2d at
278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366; see note 210 supra.
21 See note 193 supra. By limiting the scope of the pretrial suppression hearings to
issues of coercion, see Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742, 744-45 (1948), the Supreme Court
necessarily refused to include the issue of fabrication within the voluntariness concept. Peo-
ple v. Washington, 68 App. Div. 2d at 98, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 631 (2d Dep't 1979, aff'd, 51
N.Y.2d 214, 413 N.E.2d 1164, 433 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1980). Consequently, the fact that the de-
fendant had denied making a statement is a prerequisite to submission to the jury. W. RICH-
ARDSON, supra note 193, at § 502.
213 Under the common-law concept of untrustworthiness, a confession would be deemed
inadmissible if "the inducement [was] such that there was any fair risk of a false confes-
sion." 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822, at 333. This rationale was subjected to severe criti-
cism, id., due to its rejection by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-
77 (1964) and Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961). 3 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 822
at 334. Thus, it is suggested that the Washington Court's reference to "common-law limita-
tions" on the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements has further clouded the trust-
worthiness issue.
214 In a case subsequent to Harris, the Supreme Court held that a previous conviction
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deed, the lack of post-Harris authority precluding the use of ille-
gally obtained evidence on the basis of trustworthiness indicates
that its significance is rather limited. Though the trustworthiness
proviso may be available as a bridge between the impeachment
process and the constitutional mandate to protect the accused, its
parameters remain undefined after Washington. Thus, the Court
of Appeals perpetuates rather than clarifies the uncertainty engen-
dered by Harris regarding legal standards of trustworthiness.
Caroline Landau Spilberg
Publisher may be held liable for republication of libel when
grossly irresponsible acts were committed in course of original
publication
The liability of a corporate media employer who publishes a
libel215 against a private person is founded upon imputation to the
employer2 16 of its employees' grossly irresponsible conduct.21 7 It
at trial in which the defendant's constitutional right to counsel had been violated could not
be used to impeach his credibility as a witness when he testified on his own behalf in a
separate and unrelated criminal trial. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972). Although the
"trustworthiness" of such a conviction would appear to be in issue, the Loper Court did not
address that issue in reaching its result. This omission in Loper, as well as the vagueness in
Harris and Washington, suggest that perhaps the term "trustworthiness" has not yet been
clearly defined because the courts are trying to protect the rights of defendants while at-
tempting to insure that the most reliable evidence is introduced. See generally Nokes, AN
INTRODUCTION TO EvMENcE 294 (3d ed. 1962). Indeed, it appears that the degree of police
misconduct, rather than the trustworthiness of the statements, is the crucial factor in the
determination of admissibility. Id.
" Libel has been defined as a defamatory writing containing "words which tend to
expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aver-
sion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of
right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in
society." Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 218
(1933). Complete defenses to an accusation of libel include truth, Dolcin Corp. v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 7 App. Div. 2d 449, 454, 183 N.Y.S.2d 342, 347 (1st Dep't 1959), and privilege.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 at 776 (4th ed. 1971). Retraction
and introduction of evidence tending to establish the plaintiff's preexisting bad reputation,
although not complete defenses, can serve to mitigate damages. Id. at 799-801. For a brief
discussion of the history of libel law see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151-53
(1967).
21' The individual author, the corporate publisher, and other persons involved in thepublication of libel may be held jointly accountable. See Macy v. New York World-Tele-
gram Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 416, 141 N.E.2d 566, 161 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1957); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Mer-
rill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d
43, 425 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1st Dep't 1980). The liability of a corporate publisher for the acts of
